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countries and of the failure to reach 
counterterrorist and state-building 
goals, American public opinion has 
shifted largely against the wars.3 Yet, 
despite a toppling national debt and 
both vertical and horizontal growth 
of terrorist groups,4 both Obama 
and Trump initially supported in-
creasing troop levels to the Middle 
East.5 Since both wars were similar 
in their mission, these strategic fail-
ures offer many meaningful lessons. 
An analysis of what caused the U.S. 
to enter Iraq and Afghanistan and 
what keeps U.S. military presence in 
the Middle East, as well as an under-
standing of weak state dynamics, is 
necessary to determine the primary 
lesson(s) that can be drawn from the 
conflicts.
 The circumstances which fu-
eled the entrance into Afghanistan 
in late 2001 were primarily ground-
ed in the 9/11 attacks.6 Entrance 
into Iraq in 2003 was rooted in the 
faulty judgement that Saddam Hus-
sein was fostering a quickly devel-
oping Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) arsenal, but the reasoning 
for the U.S. military’s prolonged stay 
has shifted as initial goals became 
clearly unattainable.7,8 The original 
force presence in Afghanistan of 
about 1,300 troops grew to 2,500 
when the Taliban fell.9 But when 
the U.S. invaded Iraq, the Taliban 
regrouped, which led Bush to send 
10,000 more troops (bringing the 
total in 2008 to 31,000) and later 
70,000 by Obama (reduced to 9,800 
in 2016).10 In Iraq, after it became 
known that Hussein did not possess 
WMD, the Bush Administration ad-
opted the goal of “democratizing” 
the Middle East.11 The continued 
force presence in Iraq prompted an 
insurgency and a civil war, which 
allowed the Islamic State and Iran-
backed militias to gain power.12 The 
Trump administration set a goal to 
remove all troops from Afghanistan 
by late 2021, after having initially 
added troops to prevent the emer-
gence of a terrorist power vacuum.13 
Trump’s plan also included reducing 
troops in Iraq to nearly 3,000. This 
On September 11, 2001, the United States encoun-tered two comprehensive 
and unforeseen dilemmas, brought 
forth by the suicide attacks which 
took the lives of many American 
citizens. A plan of action had to 
be formulated, for recovering in-
ternally by ensuring the safety and 
comfort of American citizens, and 
for avenging the terrorist attacks 
by targeting Al-Qaeda, a terrorist 
group which operated out of the 
Middle East (originally Pakistan). 
The Bush Administration’s solution 
was to launch a public, global War 
on Terror which “[would] not end 
until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.”1 Nineteen years later, the 
U.S. military is operating counter-
terrorism missions in eighty nations 
on six continents, and it has cost 
nearly six trillion dollars and half a 
million lives.2 However, a significant 
portion of the U.S. strategy has fo-
cused on Iraq and Afghanistan. As 
a result of involvement in these two 
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change provoked mixed reactions 
from top officials, but was some-
what necessary to retain a version of 
peace following the US drone strike 
that killed General Qassim Suleima-
ni (a top Iranian officer) at Baghdad 
International Airport.14 The mili-
tary presences in Iraq and Afghan-
istan have not led to the long-term 
defeat of major terrorist groups or a 
restructuring of a new regime, and 
conflict spillover has escalated proxy 
wars into direct confrontations with 
Iran and Syria.15
 One of the primary les-
sons drawn from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan is that the United 
States should not use military force 
to overthrow foreign governments 
in weak states. This multifaceted 
approach can be broken down into 
four concepts: state-building takes 
a long time;16 nation-building is im-
possible;17 democracy must be con-
structed internally;18 and the U.S. 
military cannot solve internal state 
problems which require peaceful 
diplomatic relations.19
 As defined most compre-
hensively by M. Chris Mason from 
the United States Army War College, 
Afghanistan represented a “com-
plete lack of nationhood…[and] le-
gitimacy of governance,  and “com-
pletely inadequate and unmotivated 
security forces.” The latter statement 
is similar to the situation of South 
Vietnam, where the U.S. historically 
failed through an enormous amount 
of civilian casualties and a win for 
communist forces.20 Building a na-
tion — forming a shared political 
identity that transcends tribal and 
ethnic divides — can only be done 
slowly as an internal social process, 
and is therefore impossible as a for-
eign policy objective.21 State-build-
ing, on the other hand, “refers to a 
situation where the structure, au-
thority (legitimate power), law, and 
political order have fallen apart and 
must be reconstituted in some form, 
old or new.”22 By this definition, 
state-building has been successful-
ly achieved in Germany, Japan, and 
Korea through 70-100 year commit-
ments by U.S. military force presence 
and economic investment. There-
fore, building a state (which was one 
goal in the Iraq War in particular) 
was possible. Where the presence in 
Iraq differed, just as it had in South 
Vietnam, was that officials and mil-
itary officers were rotated every six 
to twelve months for ten to twelve 
years. Not only was the military 
present for a much shorter dura-
tion, but the continuous re-station-
ing formed an environment where 
little expertise could be gained and 
utilized.23 It was no surprise that the 
government implemented in South 
Vietnam lasted three years, and in 
Iraq only two years.24 Since the ob-
jective of democratizing the Middle 
East is both ideological and cultural, 
the United States should use peace-
keeping presence, diplomatic rela-
tions, and economic aid, instead of 
military force; more specifically, the 
U.S. must peacefully target and grow 
civilian groups, rather than project-
ing military offenses at terrorist mi-
litias and killing token leaders (like 
Osama bin Laden).25
 However, this broad tacti-
cal suggestion does not take into 
account factors that caused failures 
in pre- and post-war planning, such 
as confirmation bias,26 baseless na-
tionalistic morale,27 the absence 
of an alternative identity to aid ci-
vilian survival,28 inadequate train-
ing,29 and an unclear post-invasion 
strategy.30 These pitfalls yield more 
deliberate instructions for future 
military interventions that involve 
either targeting terrorist groups or 
overthrowing foreign governments 
in weak states.
 Although the military inva-
sion of Afghanistan was somewhat 
rushed due to the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, the war in Iraq was not, and 
there was room for more detailed 
planning mechanisms in both cases. 
Neither invasion strategy took into 
account the fact that the Middle 
East is not a direct security threat 
to the United States (as Russia and 
China are).31 Any force presence, 
especially if targeted at a terrorist 
group, would therefore be largely 
symbolic, and for this reason, need 
to be receded quickly.32 Foreign ter-
rorist attacks contribute to a small 
portion of deaths worldwide, and 
almost none on American soil,33 and 
both military capability and staying 
power are finite.34 Resources should 
therefore be focused on great-pow-




 In both cases, the Bush Ad-
ministration’s judgement in particu-
lar was severely clouded by rhetoric 
that any war could be won and that, 
in weak states, the process would be 
quick and easy. This factor set the 
initial invasion of Iraq apart from 
past wars. The CIA had missed crit-
ical nuclear developments in Paki-
stan and was in effect looking for 
any evidence to support military 
force in Iraq on the premise that 
Saddam Hussein had resumed de-
veloping a nuclear arsenal, so the 
green light was given when the re-
port confirmed the Bush Adminis-
tration’s suspicions.35 This decision 
has attracted overwhelming criti-
cism because it was highly inaccu-
rate and violated international law, 
as Iraq had “represented no threat 
to the U.S. and had no links with 
Al-Qaeda.”36 Nevertheless, the na-
tionalistic grounding of Bush’s strat-
egy remains present in the reason-
ing for further deployments to the 
Middle East. For example, President 
Obama’s remarks such as ‘I lead the 
strongest military that the world has 
ever known,’ in the context of out-
lining strategy in Syria and China, 
reflects this reasoning.37 Despite the 
large death toll, the Taliban hold-
ing control of much of Afghanistan, 
and opium production quadrupling, 
President Trump continues to insist 
that U.S. strategies are working, just 
as Bush and Obama had deceitfully 
claimed in the past.38
 Lastly, after the wars had 
been initiated, neither strategy in-
cluded a calculated plan for post-
war action or stabilization and 
peace, likely due to the fact that 
military strategy in these wars was 
in the hands of civilian officials with 
no experience in combat.39 Too few 
troops were left in Iraq to prevent 
looting, restore basic services, and 
move against the insurgency so that 
it would not further spread.40 This 
calls into question the sudden de-
cisions of the Trump administra-
tion to significantly decrease troop 
deployments in both countries, in-
cluding all private security contrac-
tors, trainers, and advisors.41 This 
could potentially further fracture 
the polity in support of terrorist 
groups, render the U.S. unable to 
monitor developments without a 
military base foothold, and leave the 
domestic military untrained.42,43
 Given these circumstances, 
there are multiple specific lessons 
to be drawn from these two wars: 
if a conflict is not an immediate se-
curity threat, but rather a symbolic 
one, a short-term strategy should be 
employed and troops should be re-
moved as soon as possible. If force 
presence is not receded quickly, a 
new strategy should be developed 
that addresses post-war involve-
ment and American military train-
ing, in particular. But above all, 
the nationalistic rhetoric of civilian 
leadership must not factor into war 
strategy or intelligence assessment.
 These lessons overlap, and 
evaluating military strategy in the 
War on Terror must address both 
broad and narrow failures in order 
to propose future objectives. The 
first distinction that must be made 
is that terrorism is not a strategy; it 
is an idea, and therefore it cannot 
only be combated through military 
means.44 Terrorist groups gain trac-
tion in fragmented societies where 
any appeal to organization is desir-
able.45 To combat this in weak states, 
any intervention style should be 
equipped with a ready alternative 
for civilian loyalty. It must first be 
distinguished whether the country 
has the capabilities for a new state 
to be built (i.e. must have a national 
identity, as was absent in Afghan-
istan) before U.S. aid is provided.46 
In terms of aid for state-building, 
the only real forces that are help-
ful are peacekeepers and economic 
assistance. In most circumstances, 
weak states will not pose a huge 
threat to American national securi-
ty. For these reasons, there is no use 
for prolonged conflict (more than 
ninety days), and resources should 
be focused in other regions after 
immediate threats have been defeat-
ed. If prolonged conflict is initiated, 
though, post-war planning is criti-
cal to any lasting success, given that 
a power vacuum would be formed 
upon exiting. Generally speaking, 
the Achilles’ heel of U.S. foreign 
policy is the democratic savior com-
plex, which most critical members 
of civilian and military leadership 
demonstrate. The quest to spread 
democracy is a waste of time and 
resources, especially when military 
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force is involved; state building often 
needs to be led from within, and the 
tendency of American leadership to 
wage war for token validation is un-
justified. Furthermore, the primary 
lesson of the wars in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan is that if the United States 
decided to militarily intervene to 
overthrow a foreign government 
(after exhaustive cost-benefit analy-
ses of using other means), thorough 
post-war planning, utilizing a vari-
ety of expert sources, should be im-
plemented.
 There are many takeaways 
from the wars in Iraq and Afghani-
stan (and the War on Terror in gen-
eral), but whether broad or detailed 
lessons are more relevant is not as 
important as ensuring that they are 
learned. The impending conflicts 
with Iran and Syria progressed es-
pecially quickly under the Trump 
Administration, and if the strategic 
mistakes outlined above are not cor-
rected, there is no telling what the 
consequences will be. The United 
States’ national debt is on track to 
nearly double by 2029, largely as a 
result of major defense spending 
and domestic tax cuts.47 This should 
provide an even more compelling 
reason for allocating resources (es-
pecially militarily) wisely and cor-
recting the mistakes of the ongo-
ing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
through future military objectives.
References
1. NY Times Editorial Board, “End 
the War in Afghanistan,” The New 
York Times: Opinion. last modi-




3. Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, 
“Lessons from the Iraq War,” 
National Review Magazine, last 




4. James McBride, Andrew Chatzky, 
and Anshu Siripurapu, “The Na-
tional Debt Dilemma,” Council on 
Foreign Relations: Backgrounder, 
last modified September 9, 2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
national-debt-dilemma.
5. Edward Wong, “Americans De-
mand a Rethinking of the ‘Forever 
War’,” The New York Times: News 




Chandler Myers, “Mirroring Viet-
nam’s Failure in Afghanistan: DoD’s 
Descent Into War Fatigue,” War 
Room: United States Army War 
College,  last modified July 24, 
2020, https://warroom.armywarcol-
lege.edu/articles/war-fatigue/.
6. CFR, “The U.S. War in Afghan-
istan: 1999-2020,” Council on 
Foreign Relations: Timeline, 2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/
us-war-afghanistan.
7. CFR, “Global Conflict Tracker: 
War in Afghanistan,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, last modified 
November 3, 2020, https://www.cfr.
org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/
war-afghanistan.
8. Brands and Feaver, “Lessons 
from the Iraq War.”
9. Ibrahim M. Oweiss, “Why did 
the United States Fail in its War 
on Iraq?” The Washington Report 





10. Myers, “Mirroring Vietnam’s 
Failure in Afghanistan: DoD’s De-
scent Into War Fatigue.”
Ibid.
11. Oweiss, “Why did the United 
States Fail in its War on Iraq?”.
12. Wong, “Americans Demand a 
Rethinking of the ‘Forever War’.”;
Max Boot, “Iran-Backed Militias in 
Iraq Poised to Expand Influence,” 
Council on Foreign Relations: In 
Brief, last modified October 13, 
2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/
riskiness-us-deal-leave-afghanistan.
13. Max Boot, “The Riskiness of 
the U.S. Deal to Leave Afghani-
stan,” Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, last modified March 2, 2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/riski-
ness-us-deal-leave-afghanistan.
14. Max Boot, “Iran-Backed Mili-




15. David E. Sanger, “Seeking Les-
sons From the Iraq War. But Which 
Ones?” The New York Times: News 





16. M. Chris Mason, “The Strategic 
Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Af-
ghan National Security Forces Will 
Not Hold, and the Implications 
for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan,” 
Strategic Studies Institute and Unit-
ed States Army War College Press, 






18. Oweiss, “Why did the United 
States Fail in its War on Iraq?”.
19. Wong, “Americans Demand a 
Rethinking of the ‘Forever War’.”
20. Mason, “The Strategic Lessons 
Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan”
21. Ibid.
22. Toby Dodge, “The Causes 
of US Failure in Iraq,” Surviv-
al: Global Politics and Strat-
egy 49, no. 1 (2007): 85-106, 
https://doi-org.libproxy.lib.unc.
edu/10.1080/00396330701254545.
23. Mason, “The Strategic Lessons 
Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan.”
24. Ibid.
25. Katherine Zimmerman, “The 
Current US Approach to Terror Is 
a Recipe for Forever War,” Defense 





26. Sanger, “Seeking Lessons From 
the Iraq War. But Which Ones?”.
27. Oweiss, “Why did the United 
States Fail in its War on Iraq?”.
28. Dodge, “The Causes of US Fail-
ure in Iraq.” 
29. NY Times Editorial Board, 
“Learning From Iraq,” The New 
York Times: Opinion, last modified 
November 26, 2006, https://www.
nytimes.com/2006/11/26/opin-
ion/26sun1.html.
30. Brands and Feaver, “Lessons 
from the Iraq War.”;
Danielle Pletka, “Testimony: 
Assessing US policy priorities in 
the Middle East,” AEI: Testimony, 




31. Ibid.; “National Intelligence 
Strategy of the United States of 





32. Mason, “The Strategic Lessons 
Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan.”
33. Hannah Ritchie, Joe Hasell, 
Cameron Appel, and Max Roser, 
“Terrorism,” Our World in Data, 
last modified November 2019, 
https://ourworldindata.org/terror-
ism.
34. CFR, “Regime Change in the 
Middle East is a False Promise, 
Writes Philip Gordon in New CFR 
Book,” Council on Foreign Re-





35. Sanger, “Seeking Lessons From 
the Iraq War. But Which Ones?”.
36. Oweiss,  “Why did the United 
States Fail in its War on Iraq?”.
37. Everett Rosenfeld, “Obama 
at the UN: I won’t hesitate to use 
force,” CNBC: White House, last 





38. NY Times Editorial Board, 
“Lots of Lessons From Afghan-
istan; None Learned,” The New 
York Times: Opinion, last modified 
December 10, 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/12/10/opinion/
afghanistan-war-papers.html.
39. Oweiss, “Why did the United 
States Fail in its War on Iraq?”.
40. NY Times Editorial Board, 
“Learning From Iraq.”;
W. Andrew Terrill, “Regional Spill-
over Effects of the Iraq War.” Army 
War College Publications, Decem-
ber 2008, https://publications.army-
warcollege.edu/pubs/1992.pdf.
41. Eric Schmitt, “U.S. to Reduce 
Troop Levels in Iraq to 3,000,” The 
New York Times: Politics, last mod-
ified September 9, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/us/
politics/iraq-troops-trump.html.
42. Dodge, “The Causes of US Fail-
ure in Iraq.” 
43. Boot, “The Riskiness of the U.S. 
Deal to Leave Afghanistan.”
44. NY Times Editorial Board, 
“End the War in Afghanistan.” 
45. Dodge, “The Causes of US Fail-
ure in Iraq.” 
46. Mason, “The Strategic Lessons 
Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan.”
47. McBride, Chatzky, and Siripu-
rapu, “The National Debt Dilem-
ma.”
13
VOL V || ISSUE II ||  SPRING 2021
Zwinger Palaceis the most famous architectural moment in Dresden, Germany. Here is a view of it in the night 
sky. 
Photo by Danny Sachs, Lafayette College Class of 2022
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This picture was taken in the Tràng An scenic area in northern Vietnam, a UNESCO world heritage site. The 
river winds through small limestone mountains and cliffs for several miles.
Photo by Christian DeSimone, Class of 2021
15
VOL V || ISSUE II ||  SPRING 2021
This photo capture's a Springtime sunset over the town of Heidelberg, Germany. 
Photo by Melina Pearson, Class of 2020
